In this talk, hosted by the Institute for the Study of the Americas (ISA), independent consultant and journalist Colin Harding offered an insightful analysis of the 2006 presidential elections in Ecuador, in which Rafael Correa was elected as president.Harding described Correa as a good speaker who had appeared as a new face representing the promise of change. In the first part of his campaign, he said, Correa focused on denouncing the inequalities of the system and arguing the need for a new constitution.  His campaign gained such momentum that he was expected to win outright; the fact that he failed to do so, Harding argued, was due to errors of judgment. For, despite his broad support base, the theoretical abstraction of his campaign put off many of the middle class, while his intellectual arguments also failed to win over enough of the poor.

Harding referred to campaign of banana tycoon Alvaro Noboa, which he described as a mixture of ‘paternalistic populism’ and ‘mysticistic religiosity’. However, in the second round, he said, Correa had rallied his supporters by claiming his defeat was due to fraud and made radical changes to his campaign; for example, he began talking about everyday issues, such as the price of cooking gas and subsidies for small farmers. It was partly this, Harding thought, that won Correa his landslide victory. However, he also thought it was as much as case of Noboa losing as Correa winning.One surprising feature of the elections, he said, was the amount of continuing support for Gutierrez’ party, the PSP. Now headed by Gutierrez’ younger brother, the party did well in the elections both on the coast and in the highlands, he said, particularly among small farmers.

Harding then discussed Correa’s recent signing of Decree No. 2  (calling for a referendum on the creation of a Constituent Assembly), which he said had created a climate of confrontation. In his view, this strategy was ‘fraught with risks’ as it would take months to go through and Correa would have to deal with a resistant Congress in the meantime. His refusal to put up any candidates in the Congressional elections had been a mistake, he said, as it meant Congress was now controlled by opposition. He also pointed out that, if Correa succeeds in creating a Constituent Assembly (which seems probable), there is likely to be a battle for control of it. This could create a situation similar to that in Bolivia, where the creation of a Constituent Assembly by Morales led to deadlock and disorder.

 Harding said there was a paradox in Correa’s position: despite his use of radically left-wing rhetoric and symbolism, he was in fact not a revolutionary, but a Catholic who wanted to avoid disorder. However, he also had to appease the left-wing of his party, who would look for any sign of a deal being made with political opponents.

 He concluded by saying that, if worst came to worst, the role of the military could be crucial in determining the future of Correa’s government. Here, he referred to the recent death of the Defense Minister, a female socialist, whose appointment had reflected Correa’s desire to make the military subordinate to civilian power.

 There then followed a question and answer session in which a number of issues were raised. One member of the audience asked about the recent role of the indigenous movement. Harding responded by saying that it had not recovered from the internal split over the relationship with the Gutierrez government and was also regionally divided. Another person commented that it seemed likely that Correa would strike a deal with Gutierrez, who has offered to support the creation of a Constituent Assembly providing he is allowed to stand as a candidate. Someone else commented that continuing support for Gutierrez may due to the fact that many people outside of the capital had felt excluded from the 2005 Quiteño coup.

 Finally, I asked two questions: how was Correa likely to respond to external pressure from the US, IFIs or foreign investors and how radical did Harding think he really was? To the first question, Harding replied that the political risk rating of Ecuador had gone up when Correa was elected but had now fallen, due partly to Correa’s more soothing recent comments. As an economist, Correa knew the potential impact of his policies and would not push too far, he predicted. Regarding the second question, he said that Correa’s rigorous intellectual formation clearly distinguished him from radical leaders such as Chavez. Also important was the influence of Belgium, both his studies there and his marriage to a woman who has links to the CDH (Christian Humanist Democrats). However, it was a good question, he said and the real extent of Correa’s radicalism remained to be seen.