La Media Luna is burning. Santa Cruz is at the brink of civil war, is what I have heard more than once in Bolivia, this week. There is a Cabildo Today in the main cities of the area that makes up the Media Luna –with Santa Cruz taking the lion’s share of the media’s attention. Today, the Cristo Redentor Avenue will host hundreds of thousands of cruzenos who will call for Autonomia in defiance of Evo Morales’ government and his authoritarian aspirations. There is no way around it, I am afraid. (I honestly hope Evo’s government is a successful one and that Bolivia, through him and others may move in a constant path out of the situation it is in.)

 

But it is not going well for Morales as he gains control of the institutions of Bolivia. His focus in getting the politics right has forgotten the skills needed to run them. And in the meantime, opposition is mounting and forcing him to tighten his grip and position –which in turn radicalises the opposition, etc. The current stand-off centres around the dos tercios (two thirds) that the constitution says is necessary in Congress to change it –Morales wants a simple majority to give him the right to re-election (sounds familiar? Try Fujimori, Menem and Chavez).

 

But the dos tercios is not the only thing in the mind of the masses in Santa Cruz, today. They will be calling for Autonomy (and that is what all the green and white flags in the city read). The main movers and shakers in Santa Cruz, it seems, is the Comite Civico (a club of rich landowners and businessmen) linked to the political leaders of the region. They are supported, nationally, by the police; but apposed by the military (which is probably why Evo has called for one Head of both institutions).

 

There is talk of civil war and general social breakdown in the country. But it is not clear who would actually fight. There are no guns in Bolivia. And the crowds gathering last night in Santa Cruz do not seem like the kind to take up arms.

 

Nevertheless the situation is as close as it will get to breaking point. If Evo gets away with his constitutional reform he will face fierce opposition and support (radicalising the situation even more –is this possible?). And he will certainly follow the same path of Fujimori, Menem and (soon) Chavez. This never lasts. They are always kicked out. But in the meantime, the path will lead to widespread impunity, arrogance and a very dangerous detachment from what is socially necessary in favour of what is politically savvy. With a more fierce opposition, he can be certain that any of his policies, good or bad, will not survive; and the revolution of Evo will die away (or at least be interrupted –Latin Americans are famous for 180 degrees turns).

 

If Evo gives in, on the other hand, he will face stronger opposition; strengthened by their victory and the ranks of disillusioned supporters who will abandon him. Can he give in, then?

 

An option might be to negotiate autonomy for the two thirds. Santa Cruz has to recognise that Evo’s re-election is certainly a greater evil than no autonomy. No re-election will force Evo and MAS to find a successor; an alternative from within their ranks. No re-election will foster democracy; it will move Bolivia in the direction of stable government transitions (which is not what democracy is only about, but in Bolivia it is certainly a start). In time, autonomy will be negotiated peacefully; and it will come. It will take time, like it has in Spain with Cataluña, but it will come. In th mean time, Santa Cruz will enjoy a place in Bolivian political life, by right and not by force.

 

Evo cannot give in (or be seen to give in). He is politically savvy enough to know that, He has been strengthened by a healthy (er) economy (which is in superavit for the first time) and is being pushed and pulled by various forces into an increasingly inflexible radical nationalistic discourse.

 

His options are limited. The choice is with the traditional politicians. They need to pick the right battle to fight. But also the choice of weapon. Bolivia is not short of strong, respected and rational civil society institutions that can act as interlocutors between the parties. These have been strengthened by both local and international processes and they should not be left aside.